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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re G.L., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E054190

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ118168)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.

Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

A.O. (mother) appeals from orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388¹ and terminating her parental rights to her son, G.L., born in June 2007. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition and rejecting the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). We reject mother's contentions and affirm the judgment.

II

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

When G.L. was almost two years old, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services – Child Protective Services (CPS) investigated a complaint that mother was neglecting G.L. and abusing drugs (methamphetamine). G.L. was mother's only child. Mother was 20 years old, single, and living with her mother (grandmother) and G.L. Mother has a criminal history of convictions for grand theft and battery. She also has a history of drug use since the age of 15 or 16 years. G.L.'s father, who never attained presumed father status, was incarcerated with a release date of March 2011. He was not named on G.L.'s birth certificate, had not married mother, and had never had contact with G.L.

On May 1, 2009, CPS received a referral that mother, who was using

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

methamphetamine, was neglecting G.L., and had left G.L. with grandmother for several days, without making any arrangements for his care. CPS contacted mother, who claimed she had stopped using drugs after previous CPS intervention. Mother agreed to a drug test but refused drug treatment, claiming she was no longer using drugs and did not need treatment. Mother's drug test was negative. On May 26, 2009, a CPS social worker requested mother receive substance abuse treatment. Mother claimed she had quit using drugs. She therefore believed she did not need treatment but would consider treatment in the future.

Grandmother told the social worker in May 2009 that she had arthritis, high blood pressure, and limited mobility. An in-home supportive services (IHSS) worker assisted her with her daily living needs. Grandmother told the CPS social worker she believed mother was using drugs. Mother left G.L. with grandmother for lengthy periods of time without making arrangements for his care. CPS recommended that G.L. not be placed with grandmother because mother was living with her. Also grandmother was disabled, requiring home assistance aid and had a criminal arrest record for obstructing an officer (most likely related to interfering in mother's arrest in 2007).

On June 4, 2009, mother had a physical altercation with her drug supplier and was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia found in her bedroom. Mother was booked and released that same day. Mother told the police she currently used methamphetamine a few times a month. G.L. was present when mother was arrested.

On June 9, 2009, CPS took G.L. into protective custody because mother was abusing methamphetamine and neglecting G.L. Mother told the CPS social worker that

she had not been using drugs and that the drug paraphernalia found in her room belonged to her brother. The CPS social worker found G.L. to be healthy and bonded to mother and grandmother. Mother agreed to attend Family Preservation Drug Court.

On June 11, 2009, the CPS filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging that mother and father failed to protect and provide adequate support for G.L. Mother allegedly supervised G.L. while under the influence of methamphetamine and had been arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia. Father was in prison.

At the detention hearing on June 12, 2009, the court ordered G.L. detained, and ordered supervised visitation and reunification services for mother. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on August 24, 2009, the court found the petition allegations true, found jurisdiction over G.L., declared G.L. a dependent of the court, and ordered G.L. removed from mother's custody and to remain in foster care. The court also ordered reunification services and supervised, weekly visitation for mother. The court approved mother's case plan requiring her to receive counseling, participate in substance abuse treatment and a parenting class, and submit to random drug testing.

Following the jurisdiction/disposition hearing mother consistently visited G.L. weekly and had extended visits. G.L. also visited grandmother every week. Mother enrolled in the family preservation court program, which included parenting education, counseling, and drug testing. Her random drug tests, from July through December 2009, were all negative. Mother was living with grandmother and was employed as grandmother's IHSS worker.

At the six-month review hearing on February 25, 2010, the court adopted the CPS recommendation of overnight and weekend visits, and placement of G.L. with mother, conditioned upon positive weekend visits and mother continuing to participate in her case plan. On June 9, 2010, G.L. was placed with mother, who was living with grandmother.

The CPS stated in its August 2010 status review report that in June 2010, mother completed a 10-week, in-home parenting education program. In July 2010, the social worker visited mother and G.L. G.L. appeared to be happy and had a strong bond with mother. Mother reported that she continued to participate in the out-patient substance abuse program and had not yet participated in individual therapy.

The CPS further reported in its August report that in February 2010, mother was discharged from the family preservation court program because she was accused of forging her signature on the meeting cards. Mother denied this. In April 2010, mother enrolled in another substance abuse program, Riverside Recovery Resources Omega (Omega). Her counselor at Omega reported that mother had missed several meetings but was doing well in the program and continued to attend regularly. Her drug tests in April and June were negative but her August 4, 2010, drug test was positive. Mother admitted she had relapsed and used methamphetamine. Because of mother's remorsefulness over her relapse, grandmother's great support, and mother's motivation to regain custody of G.L., the CPS social worker recommended G.L. remain with mother and mother continue to receive family maintenance services.

The August 25, 2010, review hearing was continued pending receipt of further drug-test results. The court ordered mother to test for drugs that same day. Mother did

not do so. The social worker repeatedly attempted to contact mother, in person and by phone, but could not locate her. Mother's phone was not in service. Finally, on September 7, 2010, the social worker contacted mother, who claimed she had been tested for drugs on August 25, 2010. The manager of the drug-testing lab confirmed that mother was not tested. Mother had been attending the OMEGA substance abuse program since April 2010, and was expected to complete it in two months. She had also completed a 10-week, in-home parenting education program. Mother had not participated in individual therapy. Mother was required to be sober for 90 days before participating in the counseling. The social worker believed mother was abusing drugs and this placed G.L. at risk.

On September 9, 2010, the CPS filed a section 387 supplemental petition, alleging that mother failed to benefit from family maintenance/reunification services, continued to use methamphetamine, and neglected to be tested for drugs. On September 7, 2010, G.L. was removed from mother's care and detained in foster care. CPS recommended the juvenile court order G.L. placed in foster care. G.L. could not be placed with grandmother because mother was living with her.

At the hearing on the section 387 supplemental petition, on September 10, 2010, the court ordered G.L. detained and ordered reunification services for mother. The court further ordered G.L. removed from mother's custody and authorized weekly supervised visitation. The court authorized placing G.L. with grandmother, conditional upon mother not living with grandmother.

The section 387 jurisdiction/disposition report filed on September 30, 2010, stated

that mother continued to claim she had been tested for drugs on August 25, 2010, until she was informed of the results of mother's drug test on September 7, 2010, which were positive. In addition, CPS reported mother had missed 13 classes in the OMEGA substance abuse program. Mother acknowledged she needed help with overcoming her drug problem. Mother was unemployed. Grandmother told CPS on September 16, 2010, that mother was moving out of grandmother's home so that G.L. could be placed with grandmother. CPS reported that there was a strong bond between G.L. and mother. Mother wanted G.L. placed with grandmother.

At the contested jurisdictional hearing on the section 387 supplemental dependency petition on October 5, 2010, the court sustained the supplemental petition allegations, found the time for reunification had expired, terminated reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing). G.L. remained in foster care.

On January 19, 2011, the CPS filed a .26 hearing report stating that mother was living in an inpatient substance abuse program, Gibson House, and had started the 90-day program on December 7, 2010. G.L. had some difficulty adjusting to returning to his previous foster care home. He wet his bed, refused to eat, and threw tantrums. G.L.'s foster mother did not wish to adopt G.L. Before mother enrolled in the Gibson House program, G.L. had supervised visits with mother and grandmother once a week. The visits went well and G.L. did not have any difficulty separating from mother when the visits ended. However, G.L. sometimes acted out later, after his visits with mother. G.L. began referring to mother by her first name and referred to his foster parents as "mom" and "dad." When mother moved to the Gibson House, she initially was unable to visit

G.L. because of a lack of transportation. G.L. continued visiting grandmother once a month.

In accordance with CPS's recommendations, on February 2, 2011, the juvenile court continued the .26 hearing because CPS was in the process of locating an appropriate adoptive family for G.L. The court also reduced mother's visitation with G.L. to once a month because adoption was recommended for G.L.

The CPS reported in its April 2011 addendum report that on March 22, 2011, G.L. was placed with a prospective adoptive family. Grandmother was not approved as a prospective adoptive parent because both times G.L. was removed from mother, mother was living with grandmother. Placing G.L. with grandmother would likely result in mother having liberal access to G.L. The social worker observed that mother manipulated grandmother, which posed a risk for G.L. In addition, grandmother had health problems which might prevent her from caring for G.L. CPS concluded there were no appropriate relative placements. G.L. reportedly was adjusting well to placement with his prospective adoptive family. Before G.L. was placed with his prospective adoptive family, G.L. had shown some anxiety before and after returning from visits with mother and grandmother. G.L. wet his bed, was grinding his teeth on the furniture, and occasionally threw mother's picture on the floor and stepped on it. CPS recommended the court terminate parental rights and order visitation take place at the discretion of G.L.'s prospective adoptive parents.

On May 2, 2011, mother filed a section 388 petition seeking to change the juvenile court's order of October 5, 2010, terminating reunification services and denying

reunification services. Mother alleged she had completed the inpatient substance abuse program at Gibson House, which included substance abuse testing, a parenting course, and counseling. Mother also had entered a sober living residence, with random drug testing, was attending Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous three times a week, attended 12-step meetings, and had a substance abuse sponsor. Mother also consistently visited G.L. Mother requested the juvenile court place G.L. with her on family maintenance or, alternatively, order reunification services and vacate the .26 hearing. Mother asserted that the requested relief was in G.L.'s best interests because he had a strong bond with mother.

On June 10, 2011, the court heard mother's section 388 petition. Mother testified that she completed the Gibson House substance abuse program on February 4, 2011. All her drug tests were negative. Mother acknowledged that after completing an outpatient program in August 2010, she relapsed in September 2010. She said her relapse was because, after her son was returned to her, mother became involved in a relationship that did not work out. Mother claimed she stopped using methamphetamines on September 8, 2010, and had been sober ever since. Mother was currently working full time at El Super and living at a sober living residence. Mother planned on enrolling in an aftercare program but she could not afford the \$600 fee and did not qualify for Medi-Cal. Mother said she had been visiting G.L. regularly and he called her "mama." She believed he had a strong bond with her and grandmother, who also had been regularly visiting G.L. Mother wanted G.L. placed with grandmother if he was not returned to her.

After hearing mother's testimony and argument, and considering CPS's reports,

the juvenile court found that “mother’s circumstances are in the process of changing. She’s in transitional sober living at this time, but her circumstances have not changed.” The court further stated, regarding the best interests of G.L., that G.L. had been in the system for almost two years. Mother had the opportunity to regain custody of G.L. She was doing well, G.L. was returned to her, and then she relapsed and started using drugs again. G.L. was currently in a stable adoptive home and needed permanency. The court concluded it was not in G.L.’s best interest to remove him from that stable, permanent preadoptive home and start over again with mother. The court denied mother’s section 388 petition.

On June 13, 2011, the court further found that grandmother was an unsuitable placement for G.L. because of grandmother’s health, financial issues, grandmother had not been “forthcoming, and the issue of enmeshment with the mother.” The juvenile court then conducted the .26 hearing and ordered parental rights terminated. The court rejected mother’s request that the court apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(b)(i).

III

DENIAL OF MOTHER’S SECTION 388 PETITION

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition alleging a change of circumstances. We disagree.

Under section 388, a juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside “if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new or changed circumstances exist, and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interest of the

child. [Citation.] The parent bears the burden to show both “a legitimate change of circumstances” and that undoing the prior order would be in the best interest of the child. [Citation.] The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (*In re S.J.* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 959-960 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)

In evaluating whether the petitioner has met his or her burden to show a change of circumstances, the trial court should consider: (1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (*In re Kimberly F.* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.) These factors become less significant once reunification services have been terminated, as in the instant case. This is because, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services, . . . ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation] . . .” (*In re Stephanie M.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)

Here, the juvenile court reasonably found that mother’s circumstances were in the process of changing, but they had not changed enough to delay proceeding with the permanent plan of adoption. “A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent . . . might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] “[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.”” [Citation.]” (*In re Mary G.* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206.)

At the section 388 petition hearing on June 10, 2011, mother claimed a change of circumstances based on completing an inpatient substance abuse rehabilitation program in February 2011 and maintaining sobriety thereafter while living in a transitional sober living residence for four months. She also was employed and had maintained a bond with G.L. by continuing to visit him once a month.

But mother did not complete the inpatient substance abuse program until four months before the section 388 hearing in June 2011. Mother began the inpatient substance abuse rehabilitation program in December 2010 and completed it in February 2011. She had been sober for a relatively short period of time, considering she previously relapsed in August 2010, after receiving reunification services, including participating in a substance abuse program. Mother claimed she relapsed because of a failed relationship with a boyfriend. Because of mother's lengthy history of abusing drugs and relapse while receiving reunification services, the juvenile court reasonably concluded mother had not been sober long enough to justify once again removing G.L. from his foster family.

Furthermore, after mother's relapse in August 2010, mother delayed enrolling in an inpatient drug rehabilitation program until December 2010. The social worker reported that mother told her that she previously had the opportunity to enroll in the Gibson House inpatient substance abuse program but she "'ran away' because she got

‘scared.’”² In addition, mother had been living in a sober living residence for only four months and had not yet enrolled in an aftercare program. Mother testified that this was because she could not afford paying for an aftercare program. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably find that there remained a substantial risk that mother would relapse, as she had done within the past year, after the court returned G.L. to mother, and it therefore was not in G.L.’s best interest to remove him from his prospective adoptive home.

Two years had elapsed from the time G.L. was initially removed from mother’s custody on June 9, 2009, until the section 388 hearing on June 2011. During this time, G.L. did not live with mother, other than during a three-month period, from June 9 to September 7, 2010, when the court returned G.L. to mother’s care. He then was ordered removed once again because mother relapsed and was using drugs again. When G.L. was initially removed from mother, he was almost two years old. Since then, G.L. remained bonded to mother through regular visitation, but the visitation became less frequent, as ordered by the court, and there were signs that G.L. had become less attached to mother. In February 2011, supervised visitation was reduced from once a week to once a month. G.L. was placed in a prospective adoptive home in March 2011 and was found to be adoptable. By the time of the section 388 hearing in June 2011, G.L. had bonded with his prospective adoptive family and was doing well.

² At the section 388 hearing mother denied this and testified the delay in enrolling in the program was because she was placed on a three-month waiting list.

Mother argues that under section 388, she was not required to establish “changed” circumstances, but only “changing” circumstances. She claims the statutory language in section 388, “change of circumstances,” is ambiguous in this regard. We disagree. Section 388, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made The petition . . . shall set forth in concise language any change of circumstance or new evidence that are alleged to require the change of order or termination of jurisdiction.”

Section 388 is clear that there must be a change of circumstances. Determination of whether the degree of change is substantial enough for modification of an order is left to “the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” (*In re S.J.*, *supra*, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 959-960; see also *In re Stephanie M.*, *supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) And “[i]t is not enough for a parent to show *just* a genuine change of circumstances under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (*In re S.J.*, at p. 960; see also *In re Kimberly F.* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529; and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a)(7), (e)(1), & (h)(d).) In *In re Mickel O.* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615, the court further concluded that “the petitioner must show *changed*, not changing, circumstances. (*In re Casey D.* [(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38,] 47.) The change of circumstances or new evidence ‘must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order.’ (*Ansley v. Superior Court* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 485.)”

Regardless of whether there must be a finding of “changed,” rather than “changing” circumstances, there must be a change and it must be significant. Here, the court reasonably found that mother failed to meet her burden of establishing a significant change of circumstances and that the proposed modified order was in G.L.’s best interests. Mother provided evidence of change in her circumstances, including completing an inpatient substance abuse program and moving into a sober living residence. The juvenile court acknowledged mother was making progress but concluded it was not enough to grant mother’s section 388 petition. The court stated “that it does appear that the mother’s circumstances are in the process of changing. She’s in transitional sober living at this time, but her circumstances have not changed.” The court thus concluded mother had not established she had completely reformed. The court reasonably found she had not established she had remained sober for a sufficiently lengthy period of time and had actually changed and become permanently sober.

Here, regardless of whether mother’s circumstances are viewed as “changed” or merely “changing,” the changes “must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order” (*Ansley v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 485) and the proposed section 388 order must be in the child’s best interests. As noted in *Casey D.*, “The parent bears the burden of showing both a change of circumstance exists and that the proposed change is in the child’s best interests. [Citation.] A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point,

does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests. [Citation.]

“‘[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.’” [Citation.]” (*In re Casey D.*, *supra*, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.)

Because “a child’s need for permanency and stability cannot be delayed for an extended time without significant detriment” (*Daria D. v. Superior Court* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 611), and mother had relapsed within the past year and only recently had completed a substance abuse treatment program, the juvenile court reasonably found that G.L.’s need for permanency and stability could best be met by allowing him to be adopted by his prospective adoptive family. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s section 388 petition.

IV

THE BENEFICIAL PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION

Mother contends the trial court committed reversible error in terminating her parental rights. Specifically, she argues the juvenile court erred in rejecting the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). This exception is often raised but rarely applies. (*In re Eileen A.* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds in *In re Zeth S.* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413.) While it can have merit in an appropriate case (e.g., *In re S.B.* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296-301), this is not such a case.

Mother argues the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied because G.L. had a strong bond with mother, he was close to his grandmother, he had lived with mother most of his life (until he was two years old) and his removal the second time, in

September 2010, was relatively recent. In addition, G.L. had only been living with his prospective adoptive family three months when parental rights were terminated.

Generally, at a § 366.26 hearing, if the juvenile court finds that the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).) This rule, however, is subject to a number of statutory exceptions (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi)), including the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, which applies when “termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

“When applying the beneficial parental relationship exception, the court balances the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging that a stable family would confer on the child. If severing the existing parental relationship would deprive the child of ‘a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ [Citation.]” (*In re B.D.* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234-1235.)

“‘[F]or the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt.’ [Citation.]” (*In re Jason J.* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938.) “‘A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail adoption merely by showing the child would derive *some* benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent.

[Citation.] A child who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be *beneficial to some degree*, but that does not meet the child's need for a parent.' [Citation.]" (*Id.* at p. 937.)

"We must affirm a trial court's rejection of these exceptions if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]" (*In re Zachary G.* (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.) The courts have also applied the abuse of discretion standard of review. (*In re Scott B.* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469, *In re Jasmine D.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) "The practical differences between the two standards of review are not significant." (*In re Scott B.*, at p. 469, quoting *In re Jasmine D.*, at p. 1351.) Under either standard, "[w]e . . . review[] the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling. [Citation.]" (*In re B.D.*, *supra*, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.) Because mother had the burden of proof, we must affirm unless there was "indisputable evidence [in her favor] no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected" (*In re Sheila B.* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)

Here, there was not such indisputable evidence in mother's favor requiring reversal. Mother had a lengthy history of drug abuse, she had relapsed within a year before the .26 hearing, requiring returning G.L. to foster care, she had only relatively recently completed an inpatient substance abuse treatment program, and had been living in a transitional sober living residence for four months, without enrolling in an aftercare program. There still remained a substantial risk that mother would relapse, as she had

done within the past year. Despite the evidence that mother appropriately interacted with G.L., and visits were regular and went well, mother had not established that G.L. was so bonded with mother that it would be in his best interest to forego the benefits of adoption.

Sadly, the parent-child bond that may have existed at the time of G.L.'s initial removal in June 2009, appears to have dissipated over time. G.L. began calling mother by her first name and referred to his prospective adoptive parents as mother and father. During the six-month period preceding termination of parental rights, mother visited G.L. once a month and G.L. had not shown separation anxiety when visits with mother ended. Although mother remained bonded to G.L. and her relationship with him may be beneficial to G.L. to some degree, any such benefit was not enough to outweigh the benefit of placing G.L. in a stable, permanent adoption home. G.L. had not been living with his prospective adoptive family for very long (only three months) but he had adjusted well to his new home, was happy there, and his prospective adoptive family wished to adopt him. We therefore affirm the trial court's rejection of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. (*In re Zachary G.*, *supra*, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.)

V

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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CODRINGTON
J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST
Acting P.J.

KING
J.